Iª q. 29 a. 1 ad 1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet hoc singulare vel illud definiri non possit, tamen id quod pertinet ad communem rationem singularitatis, definiri potest, et sic philosophus definit substantiam primam. Et hoc modo definit Boetius personam.

Iª q. 29 a. 1 ad 2. Ad secundum dicendum quod, secundum quosdam, para completar la disputatio leer hasta Iª q. 29 a. 4 ad 4.

101.a C Plinius Caecilius Secundus
Ponderantur, non numerantur
[items of evidence] are weighed, not counted
Tradional heuristic maxim; compare the opposite at Numerantur Numerantur enim sententiae, non ponderantur
For the votes are counted, not weighed
Pliny the Younger, Epistulae 2/12:5
explaining why some unwise measure was adopted; compare at Ponderantur
C. Plinius Cæcilius Secundus: Epistulae
3 Jam quanta sermonibus ejus fides, quanta auctoritas, quam pressa et decora.....Numerantur enim sententiae, non ponderantur; nec aliud in publico.

102.a Rusells Bertrand, Consequentialism, Emotivism and Moral Reform Russell's Moral Philosophy by Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy First published Mon Dec 17, 2007. Russell versus Moore: Two Kinds of Consequentialism.

Although Russell became a convert to the doctrines of Principia Ethica, he disagreed with Moore on two important points. Russell, like Moore was what is nowadays known as a consequentialist. He believed that the rightness or otherwise of an act is ‘in some way, dependent on consequences’. But for the young Moore, it is ‘demonstrably certain’ (!) that ‘I am morally bound to perform this action’ is identical [that is synonymous] with the assertion ‘This action will produce the greatest amount of possible good in the Universe’. (PE: ch. 5, §89.) Thus it is analytic that the right thing to do is the action that will, actually produce the best consequences. But in Russell's view this claim is neither analytic nor true. Moore's own Open Question Argument can be deployed to prove that it is not analytic and a little critical reflection reveals that it is not true. ‘It is held [by Moore] that what we ought to do is that action, among all that are possible, which will produce the best results on the whole; and this is regarded as constituting a definition of ought. I hold that this is not a definition, but a significant proposition, and in fact a false one.‘ (RoE: 101/Papers 4: 573.) It is a ‘significant’ or non-analytic proposition because a competent speaker can believe that X is the act that will produce the best consequences without believing that he ought to do it. If the two propositions ‘X is the act available to me that will produce the best consequences’ and ‘I ought to do X’ were really synonymous, then a competent speaker could not believe the one whilst remaining doubt about the other. Since this is perfectly possible (as is shown by the fact that ‘Ought I to do what will have the best results?’ is an obstinately open question for competent speakers of English) the two claims are not synonymous.

But the fact that these claims are not synonymous does not show that it is false that I ought to do that act which will, in fact, produce the best consequences. The latter claim could be synthetic (or, as Russell would have it, ‘significant’) but true. Why does Russell think it false? Russell raises thead hominem objection that Moore's thesis is flatly inconsistent with the moral conservatism that he goes on to embrace. According to Moore, although ‘there are cases where [an established moral] rule should be broken’, since ‘in some cases the neglect of an established moral rule will be the best course of action possible’, nevertheless, ‘we can never know what those cases are, and ought, therefore, never to break it.’ (PE: §99.) ‘The individual, therefore, can be confidently recommended always to conform to rules which are generally useful and generally practiced.’ But if we ought to perform the best action possible, what this implies is that there are some cases (though we can never know which) where we ought to do what it is not the case that we ought to do. Moore could avoid this contradiction by adopting the view that what we ought to do is that action which we have reason to believe will, produce the best consequences. As Russell himself put it, Moore's moral conservatism ‘implies that we ought to do what we have reason tothink will have the best results, rather than what really will have the best results’ [my italics] — since, in any given instance, we may have reason tothink that the conventionally right act will have the best consequences even though we know that this won't always be the case

103.a Scarpelli U Assenza di danno rilevante, principio di toleranza page 65. Manuale di Bioetica vol 1. E. Sgreccia, Vita e Pensiero,2006. pag 47,50,53, 60 (Etica senza verita, Bologna 1982.

104.a Engelhardt.H.T: Manuale di Bioetica vol 1. E. Sgreccia, Ed. Vita e Pensiero. 2006. Pag. 58. Foundations of bioethics. Ny.1996. The FOUNDATIONS OF BIOETHICS POR H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR.: COMENTARIOS A LA RESEÑA DE JAMES F. DRANE (principio del permiso, sustituto del principio de autonomia y de la beneficiencia). H.T.Engelhardt “I acknowlwedge the postraditional and post-Christian character of our culture, its character is not something I celebrate. Quite the contrary.

105.a Jansen, A. Siegler M y Winsdale, W La investigación clínica. En: Ética clínica. Ariel, Barcelona, 2005. pp.320 y sig.

106.a Scheller M, Hartman N. In: Manuale di Bioetica vol 1. E. Sgreccia, Ed. Vita e Pensiero. 2006. Pag. 58.

107.a Gracia D. In: Manuale di Bioetica vol 1. E. Sgreccia, Ed. Vita e Pensiero. 2006. Pag. 58. “ Etica Formale dei Beni, afferma l éssigenza formale e universale dei valori, in quanto la stessa conoscenza della realta suscita nella coscienza il senso della realtacome valori,ma tale esigenza,formale si realizza in atti di valutazione o valorizzazione che sono soggettivi e dettati dalle circonstanze. Come esigenza, la morale e fondata in senso razionale e universale, ma come scelta concreta torna ad essere dettata dalla valutazione soggetiva.) Gracia, Fundamentos de bioética pag. 363-382.

108.a Veatch R.M. In: Manuale di Bioetica vol.1 E. Sgreccia, Ed. Vita e Pensiero. 2006. Pag. 62. Por Robert M. Veatch (Medical ethics, The patient-physician relation: the patient as partner), última visita 10 de Octubre 2010.

109.a John Rawls (b. 1921, d. 2002) was an American political philosopher in the liberal tradition. His theory of justice as fairness envisions a society of free citizens holding equal basic rights cooperating within an egalitarian economic system. His account of political liberalism addresses the legitimate...
The original position is a central feature of John Rawls's social contract account of justice, “justice as fairness,” set forth in A Theory of Justice (TJ). It is designed to be a fair and impartial point of view that is to be adopted in our reasoning about fundamental principles of justice....

110.a Beauchamp TL, Childress JF. Principles of biomedical ethics. 3a ed. New York: Oxford University Press; 1989:215-218. Bioethic Tools: Principles of Bioethics 11 Apr 2008... Additional Reading: Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (4th edition) (New York: Oxford University Press, …

111.a Apel K.O in Manuale di Bioetica vol.1 E. Sgreccia, Ed. Vita e Pensiero. 2006. Pag. 59. Habermas Jürgen … pone alla base la comunicazione che dovrebbe consentire da una parte il superamento della “ ragione calcolante” dell ’utilitarismo e dall’altra dovrebbe aprire la possibilita dell’intesa sui contenuti e destinatari dei valori.

112.a Habermas Jürgen, in Manuale di Bioetica vol.1 E. Sgreccia, Ed. Vita e Pensiero. 2006. Pag. 59. Standford Encyclopedia., Theory of communicative action. To understand Habermas's mature positions, we must start with his Theory of Communicative Action (TCA), a two-volume critical study of the theories of rationality that informed the classical sociologies of Weber, Durkheim, Parsons, and neo-Marxist critical theory (esp. Lukács, Horkheimer, Adorno). More importantly, in TCA we find Habermas's conception of the task of philosophy and its relation to the social sciences—a conception that still guides much of his work. While TCA defends the emphasis on normativity and the universalist ambitions found in the philosophical tradition, it does so within a framework that includes particular sorts of empirical social research, with which philosophy must interact. Philosophers, that is, must cooperate with social scientists if they are to understand normative claims within the current historical context, the context of a complex, modern society that is characterized by social and systemic modes of integration. The problem with pessimistic social theories of modernity is that they miss the cultural dimension of modernization due to a one-sided, primarily instrumental conception of rationality.

113.a Bentham Jeremy. Standford Encyclopedia: History of Utilitarianism The Classical Utilitarians, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, identified the good with pleasure, so, like Epicurus, were hedonists about value. They also held that we ought to maximize the good, that is, bring about ‘the greatest amount of good for the greatest number’.Utilitarianism is also distinguished by impartiality and agent-neutrality. Everyone's happiness counts the same. When one maximizes the good, it is the good impartially considered. My good counts for no more than anyone else's good. Further, the reason I have to promote the overall good is the same reason anyone else has to so promote the good. It is not peculiar to me.All of these features of this approach to moral evaluation and/or moral decision-making have proven to be somewhat controversial and subsequent controversies have led to changes in the Classical version of the theory.